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COMMENT/Recent Constitutional Developments
in State Taxation-Reduction by
Constitutional Merger?
It was as true ... as turnips is.
It was as true ... as taxes is.
And nothing's truer than them.*
INTRODUCTION
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATE TAX affecting interstate commerce is a
question of perennial recurrence.' The facets of the problem are innumer-
able and the solutions often muddled and inarticulate. 2 The difficulty is one
of attempting to conform legal theory in the construction of constitutional
provisions to economic reality and as a result to achieve a smoothly operat-
ing federal system.
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the manner in which the due
process clause3 and the commerce clause 4 of the federal constitution have
been applied in the resolution of questions concerning a state's ability to tax
a foreign business engaged in multistate activities. The most recent Supreme
Court decision regarding this double constitutional question remains Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Washington,5 however, the problem is now before the
*DICKENs, DAVID COPPERFIELD.
" The problem of state taxation of interstate commerce has been argued before the Su-
preme Court more than three hundred times. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959).
2 Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954).
Despite the increasing frequency with which the question arises, little constructive
discussion can be found in responsible commentary as to the grounds on which to rest
a state's power to reach extraterritorial transactions or on nonresidents with tax li-
abilities. Our decisions are not always clear as to the grounds on which a tax is sup-
ported, especially where more than one exists; nor are all of our pronouncements
during the experimental period of this type of taxation consistent or reconcilable. A
few have been specifically overruled, while others no longer fully represent the present
state of the law.
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 1, at 457, quoting Wis-
consin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940).
That there is a 'need for clearing up the tangled underbrush of past cases' with
reference to the taxing power of the States is a concomitant to the negative approach
resulting from a case-by-case resolution of 'the extremely limited restrictions that the
Constitution places upon the states....'
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8377 U.S. 436 (1964) (privilege tax). American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965) (ex-
cise tax) (was decided on due process grounds alone).
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Court once again. 6 The General Motors decision was heralded as a "thump-
ing blow" to the "tax free sanctity on interstate commerce."'7 In the words
of dissenting Mr. Justice Goldberg "... it is difficult to conceive of a state
gross receipts tax on interstate commerce which could not be sustained under
the rationale adopted today."8
The State of Washington levied a tax for the privilege of engaging in bus-
iness activities within the state, measured by the gross receipts of wholesale
sales.0 General Motors, a Delaware corporation, manufactured motor
vehicles, parts, and accessories in California, Missouri, and Michigan, which
it sold at wholesale to independent retail dealers in Washington. The tax-
payer did have a number of sales representatives or district managers and
service representatives in the State acting in a promotional and supervisory
capacity with regard to the retail dealers. However, these managers had no
offices in the State, but worked with the dealers in furtherance of the corpo-
ration's interstate business.10 Four General Motors' divisions were involved
in the tax dispute. Two of them engaged in no intrastate business in Wash-
ington, and operated entirely through a Portland, Oregon, zone office and
the various local sales representatives in Washington. A third division main-
tained a one-man branch office in Seattle, Washington. This office was
operated under the direction of the Portland zone office for the purpose of
facilitating the management and handling of sales and orders from the
dealers in the northen counties of Washington. The remaining sales to the
dealers in the southern counties were on a par with the two divisions pre-
viously mentioned." The fourth division sold motor parts within the State
of Washington and also maintained warehouses in Portland and Seattle.
Taxes levied with respect to the sales made to Washington customers from
the Seattle warehouse were not disputed by General Motors, however it did
contest Washington's ability to tax sales from the Portland warehouse to the
Washington buyers.12
The taxpayer contended that the tax levied on the unapportioned gross
receipts from all wholesale sales in the State constituted a tax on the privi-
lege of engaging in interstate commerce, was inherently discriminatory, re-
sulted in the imposition of multiple tax burdens and was a deprivation of
property without due process of the law. The Supreme Court, in a five to
four decision, upheld the tax as a constitutionally fair exaction for the privi-
lege of carrying on business activities within the State.
ODepartment of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 34 Il. App. 2d 164, 214 N.E.2d
755, prob. juris. noted, 87 S. Ct. 58 (1966).
Comment, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1207 (1965).
8 General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra note 5, at 456 (dissenting opinion).
9 WASH. REv. CODE §§ 82.04.060-.270 (1961).
10 General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra note 5, at 443-44.
"Id. at 452-53 (dissenting opinion).
111d. at 453 (dissenting opinion).
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The effect of this decision cannot be simply stated. It represents the
emergence, as a majority opinion, of the reasoning of a long line of dissents.13
Its thrust is a more liberal approach to state taxation of interstate commerce
by a suppression of formal distinctions and by an economically realistic eval-
uation of the effect of a tax. It appears to be an attempt to set the stage for
more immediate and effective action by Congress, by placing the present
burden on the taxpayers and by de-emphasizing the applicability of the due
process clause in favor of the commerce clause, Congress having discretion to
legislate with respect to the latter clause but not the former.14
DUE PROCESS OF LAW-THE PROBLEMS OF CONTACTS15
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment "... requires some
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person,
property or transaction it seeks to tax."' 6 This concept of minimum connec-
tions has traditionally represented the threshold question in determining
whether a state can levy a particular tax.' 7 ".... the absence of any connec-
tion in fact between the commerce and the state would be sufficient in itself
for striking down the tax on due process grounds alone .... 18
The question of what is the test for determining sufficient connection with
a state to sustain a tax for the purposes of due process is not a simple one. The
question manifests itself in several ways, but in order to evaluate the prob-
lem, the tax must be separated into its two parts-the subject and the meas-
ure. A tax is levied on a particular subject, for example property, sale, use,
privilege of doing business, etc., and is measured by an application of the
13 Since 1938, a minority of the Court has opposed the striking down of state taxes levied
on aspects of interstate commerce with ever increasing strength. Cf. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938) (Justice Black dissenting); McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S.
327 (1944) (Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissenting); Nippert v. City of Richmond,
327 U.S. 416 (1946) (Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissenting); Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249 (1946) (Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissenting); Central Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948) (Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissenting);
Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951) (Justices Black, Clark and
Douglas dissenting); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (Justices
Black, Clark and Douglas dissenting); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952) (Justice
Black dissenting); Miller Bros. v. Maryland, supra note 2 (Justices Black, Clark, Douglas and
Warren dissenting); Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954) (Justices
Black, Clark, Douglas and Warren dissenting); American Oil Co. v. Neill, supra note 5
(Justice Black dissenting).
1 See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590, 603 (1954) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Mr. Justice Douglas alluded to this underlying rationale by stating: "... when
we are faced with a due process question, we have a problem we may not delegate to
Congress."
"It must be noted that this review of due process decisions includes many cases in which
several Justices dissent and represents the background in light of which the Court's present
trend must be viewed. See note 13 supra.
"Miller Bros. v. Maryland, supra note 2, at 344-45.
" American Oil Co. v. Neill, supra note 5, at 458.
Nippert v. City of Richmond, supra note 13, at 423.
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tax rate to an appropriate value.19 This value may be that of the property,
gross receipts, net income, capital stock, etc. It is therefore necessary not only
that the subject of the tax be under the jurisdiction of the state 0 but also
that the appropriate value or measure to which the state applies its rate,
includes only property or transactions with which the state has some nexus
or minimum connection.21
International Shoe Co. v. Washington2 2 established that systematic and
continuous activity constituted sufficient connection to warrant a finding
of corporate presence within the state.23 But it is clear from American Oil
Co. v. Neil124 that corporate presence does not automatically satisfy the due
process requirement for a given tax. The question is, do the subject and the
measure of the tax have sufficient connection to establish jurisdiction. Al-
though the taxpayer in American Oil was engaged in business within the
taxing state and held a license to do business there, an excise tax on a sale
of oil, f.o.b. out-of-state, the "legal incidence" of which fell upon petitioner,25
was held invalid under the due process clause. The reason for this was that
the transaction (the subject of the tax) was totally "disassociated from the
local business." 26
Likewise, due process has been held to prohibit a state from measuring
what would otherwise be a valid license fee or excise tax, on a foreign corpo-
ration, by property not located or used within the state. In International
Paper Co. v. Massachusetts2 7 the taxing state attempted to levy an excise tax
11 Note, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV.
953, 960 (1962).
20 American Oil Co. v. Neill, supra note 5.
11International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918) (excise tax); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910) (excise tax); Norton Co. v. Department of
Revenue, supra note 13. Compare Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325 (1920)
(property tax).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
BId. at 319.
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of
the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was
the purpose of the due process clause to insure.... But to the extent that a corporation
exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state.
Id. at 320.
Applying these standards, the activities carried on in behalf of appellant in the State
of Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and continuous
throughout the years in question .... It is evident that these operations establish suffi-
cient contacts of ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just ... to
permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there.
Id. at 321.
The activities which established its 'presence' subject it alike to taxation by the state
and to suit to recover the tax.2
1 Supra note 5.
21 Id. at 456.
RId. at 458, quoting Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra note 13.
27 Supra note 21.
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measured by the par value of the entire authorized capital stock of a foreign
corporation doing both local and interstate business. The tax was struck
down on both due process and commerce clause grounds.28
A slightly different situation exists where the taxing state is the domicile
of the taxpayer. 29 Thus a railroad or other business owning rolling stock can-
not avoid the imposition of a property tax by the domiciliary state on the
full value of its assets merely by showing that some of its property was absent
from the state for part of the tax year. Tangible property for which no tax
situs has been established elsewhere may be taxed to its full value by the
owner's domicile.3 0 The burden of proving that an exemption, on the basis
of the property having acquired a tax situs in another jurisdiction, is on the
taxpayer claiming it.81 However, the domiciliary state may not impose an
ad valorem tax on any property to the extent that it could be taxed by an-
other state, i.e., having acquired a tax situs elsewhere. Thus the test in this
case is not whether the property is actually being taxed by another jurisdic-
tion.32 It is to be noted that this test is not the same as that used by the Court
in determining whether a state tax on a foreign corporation doing business
in the state should be sustained despite the commerce clause's prohibition
against multiple taxation.3 3
Returning to the question of a state tax on a foreign corporation, the prob-
lem in International Paper was not one of contacts with the taxpayer, who
was manufacturing and selling within the state, but one of contacts with the
intangible property which the state was using as its measure.8 4 On the other
hand, where a state levied a tax on a foreign corporation, doing local and
interstate business, for the privilege of declaring and receiving dividends
out of income derived from property located and business transacted in the
taxing state, the tax was held valid.3 5 The rationale was that the privilege
granted by a state to carry on local business supports a tax on the income
derived from that business.8 6
SId. at 141-44.
Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962) (property tax); Northwest Airlines v.
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944) (property tax); New York Central R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S.
584 (1906) (property tax).
8 Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 29, at 612; Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota,
supra note 29, at 296. See Johnson Oil Refinery Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158, 161 (1933)
(property tax). Compare Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905),
which held that the due process clause prohibited ad valorem taxation by the owner's
domicile, of tangible personal property permanently located in another state.
Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 29, at 613.
I21d. at 614.
8 See p. 443 infra.
See American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459, 464-65 (1919) (property tax).
5 The dividends were voted and checks drawn upon banks in the state of the corporation's
principal office. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 443 (1940).
6 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney, supra note 35.
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That test is whether property was taken without due process of law, or, if para-
phrase we must, whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal re-
lation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state. The simple
but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it
can ask return.... The fact that the tax is contingent upon events brought to
pass without a state does not destroy the nexus between such a tax and trans-
actions within the state for which the tax is an exaction. 7
As seen previously, although the taxpayer was doing local business, the
due process clause prohibited the state from levying a tax on, or measuring
it by, assets or transactions which were physically outside the jurisdiction of
the state. A more complex problem presents itself where the taxpayer's
"presence" in the state is equally at issue. The importance of "presence" lies
in the fact that the Court is faced with two issues: one of jurisdiction under
the due process clause, and one of valid exaction under the commerce clause.
A foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce may be
exempted from a tax under the commerce clause because it amounts to an
exaction on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce,38 or it may be
found that the state has no jurisdiction to tax the transaction in the light of
due process,8 9 depending upon the type of tax involved. As a result of the
fine distinctions that have been made with respect to the different types of
taxes, confusion has resulted 40 and it is against this confusion that the liberal
approach to state taxation reacts. 41
Miller Bros. v. Maryland,42 in a negative way indicated the outer limits of
sufficient connections to meet the due process requirements. A five to four
majority there declared that a Delaware department store was not liable for
the collection of a use tax levied on the citizens of that state.43 The only con-
nections the taxpayer had with the State of Maryland were deliveries in
Maryland of goods purchased by Maryland residents at the Delaware store,
and advertising in media that reached Maryland consumers.44 The Court
did not discuss any commerce clause implications, but relied solely on the
81 Id. at 444-45.
88Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, supra note 13. In this case a tax was levied for
the privilege of doing business in the state on a trucking company doing only interstate
hauling. Justices Black, Clark and Douglas dissented, stating that the decision should not
turn on whether the company was doing business within the state for the purposes of the
privilege tax but whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return. Compare
International Harvester v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947).
"Miller Bros. v. Maryland, supra note 2.
" See p. 437-38 infra.
" See p. 446 infra.
"Supra note 2. This case has not been disturbed to the date of this comment, but Depart-
ment of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., supra note 6, now awaiting decision in the
Supreme Court may call its soundness into question. It is to be noted that Chief Justice
Warren, with Justices Black, Clark, and Douglas dissented in Miller Bros.
Id. at 345-47.
"See id. at 358 (dissenting opinion).
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due process clause. The connections between the taxpayer and the taxing
state were insufficient.
Ten years earlier the Supreme Court sustained the liability of a foreign
corporation for collection of a use tax on the citizens of the taxing state, even
though the taxpayer had no office, branch, or warehouse in the state, but
solicited orders by traveling salesmen.45 The orders were subject to accep-
tance out of state, and the goods were shipped either by common carrier or
by mail. It appeared that the initial question would be that of due process,
but the Court did not mention that consideration and sustained the tax as
not violative of the commerce clause.46 Presumably, therefore, due process
was satisfied.47
In a companion case, however, with a similar fact situation,48 a state's
sales tax (on the transaction as distinguished from the use) was struck down
because, "For Arkansas to impose a tax on such transactions would be to
project its powers beyond its boundaries49 and to tax an interstate transac-
tion."5 0 (Emphasis added.) The Court there made the distinction between
use as a subject and sales as a subject and apparently concluded that the
same set of facts was sufficient for due process in one case and not in the
other.51 Mr. Justice Rutledge in his dissenting opinion5 2 denied the validity
of the distinction.
4
5 General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
4Id. at 338.
Of course no State can tax the privilege of doing interstate business. See Western Live
Stock v. Bureau [of Revenue], 303 U.S. 250. That is within the protection of the Com-
merce Clause and subject to the power of Congress. On the other hand, the mere fact that
property is used for interstate commerce or has come into an owner's possession as a
result of interstate commerce does not diminish the protection which he may draw from
a State to the upkeep of which he may be asked to bear his fair share.
" See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); accord, Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,
362 U.S. 207 (1960).
" McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
" This is due process language, although the Court does not use the phrase.
10 McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth, supra note 48, at 330. The Court went on to say that it is
irrelevant to make the point that if the state had called the tax a use tax instead of a sales
tax, it could have been sustained.
A sales tax and a use tax in many instances may bring about the same result. But they
are different in conception, are assessments upon different transactions, and the inter-
lacings of the two legislative authorities within our federation may have to justify
themselves on different constitutional grounds. A sales tax is a tax on the freedom of
purchase .... A use tax is a tax on the enjoyment of what was purchased. In view of
the differences in the basis of these two taxes and the differences in the relation of the
taxing state to them, a tax on an interstate sale like the one before us and unlike the
tax on the enjoyment of the goods sold, involves an assumption of power by a State
which the Commerce Clause was meant to end.
Compare McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940), where a
sales tax on a foreign corporation was upheld as not violating the protections of the com-
merce clause and as being "activity which, apart from its effect on the commerce, is subject
to the state taxing power." Id. at 58.
Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissented in a separate opinion. McLeod v. J. E.
Dilworth Co., supra note 48.
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The Court's different treatment of the two taxes does not result from any
substantial difference in the facts under which they are levied or the effects they
may have on interstate trade. It arises rather from applying different constitu-
tional provisions to the substantially identical taxes, in one the case to invali-
date that of Arkansas, in the other to sustain that of Iowa. Due process destroys
the former. Absence of undue burden upon interstate commerce sustains the
latter.58
In other words, under the majority opinion, an out-of-state seller who has
sufficient establishment in the buyer-state may be required to pay a sales tax54
and to collect a use tax.5 5 Without the sufficient buyer-state establishment,
he may not be compelled to pay a sales tax,5 6 but he may still be obliged to
collect and pay over a use tax,57 within the bounds of Miller Bros. v. Mary-
land.58 This situation not only provoked strong dissent but inspired com-
mentary terming the decisions "indefensible." 59
Another contacts problem existed where a net income tax was levied on
a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce.6 0 The tax
was exacted from that portion of the taxpayer's income arising from activi-
ties within the state. The Court upheld the tax because there was found to
exist a sufficient "nexus" between the tax and the in-state activities.61
The "drummer" cases have seldom been referred to in Supreme Court
opinions as due process problems.6 2 In an unbroken line of these cases, dating
back to 1887,63 the question presented was the validity of a license tax on a
International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 352 (1944). This
dissenting and concurring opinion covers three companion cases: McLeod v. Dilworth,
supra note 48, Central Trading Co. v. Tax Comm'n, supra note 45, and International Har-
vester Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.
"' McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., supra note 51.
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra note 47.
w McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., supra note 48.
"General Trading Co. v, Tax Comm'n, supra note 45.
347 U.S. 340 (1954).
59 POWELL, VAGARIES & VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 192 (1956).
8'Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959) (net
income tax).
"Id. at 464. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920) (income
tax). After the decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement, Congress passed legislation
requiring more than mere solicitation in order for a state to levy an income tax on a foreign
corporation. 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964).
"Annot., 67 A.L.R. 2d 1322, 1326 (1959). But see Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U'S.
416, 423 (1946).
"Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887); Corson v. Maryland, 120
U.S. 502 (1887); Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129 (1888); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141
(1889); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894); Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27 (1902);
Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 (1903); Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507 (1906);
International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910); Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U.S. 124
(1910); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913); Rogers v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 401 (1913);
Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 665 (1914); Davis v. Virginia, 236 U.S. 697 (1915); Cheney
Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918); Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268
U.S. 325 (1925); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940); Nippert v. City of Richmond,
supra note 62; Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
[Vol. XVI
Comments
drummer or solicitor making sales by sample and obtaining orders for an
out-of-state vendor. It has been consistently held that the commerce clause
prohibits such license taxes because they discriminate in favor of local mer-
chants and constitute a tax on the privilege of making interstate sales.64
Nippert v. City of Richmond6 5 was perhaps the first "drummer" case to
consider both the due process and the commerce clause. The Court found
that the record did not indicate any systematic and continuous activity with-
in the taxing state to satisfy the due process requirement under the Interna-
tional Shoe test.66 But due process notwithstanding, the Court went on to
find the tax violative of the commerce clause. The City of Richmond at-
tempted to dissect the interstate transaction in order to meet the require-
ments of the commerce clause, arguing that the license tax in question was
imposed upon an event, occurring within the taxing jurisdiction, which was
separate and distinct from the transportation or interstate commerce. 67 The
event cited was the "incident of solicitation" and was compared to the local
incident of delivery that the Court noted as the basis of a valid sales tax in
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.6s However, a five to three
majority69 stated that if the only thing required under the commerce clause
to sustain the tax was to discover some separate and distinct local incident,
and lay the tax upon that, all interstate commerce would be subject to state
taxation.70
But beyond the presence of a sufficient connection in a due process or "jurisdic-
tional" sense, whether or not a "local incident" related to or affecting commerce
may be made the subject of state taxation depends upon other considerations of
constitutional policy having reference to the substantial effects, actual or po-
tential, of the particular tax in suppressing or burdening unduly the com-
merce. 71
Those "other considerations" are the purposes of the commerce clause of the
federal constitution.
o Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., supra note 63.
05 Supra note 62.
Id. at 426.
But we do not think the tax as it was applied in this case either conforms to those con-
ditions of regularity and continuity [test of due process) or avoids other prohibited
effects [discrimination against interstate commerce].
7 Id. at 422.
Supra note 51.
Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissented. Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the
case.
70 Nippert v. City of Richmond, supra note 62, at 423.
n Id. at 423-24.
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COMMERCE CLAUSE-THE PROBLEM OF APPORTIONMENT 72
Presently, the most pressing problem 73 dealing with the commerce clause in
the area of state taxation is that of apportionment. This difficulty emanates
from the commerce clause's proscription against burdening or interfering
with commerce, which the Court has construed as a prohibition against mul-
tiple taxation. Apportionment by its nature alleviates the possibility of mul-
tiple taxation. The theory of apportionment, if proper allocation is made, is
that no other state can duplicate the tax.74 It should be stressed, lest confu-
sion might arise, 75 that the problem of apportionment is purely a commerce
clause difficulty, and that it has no direct connection with the due process
clause. This is emphasized by the statement, aptly phrased by Mr. Justice
Holmes, that the "Fourteenth Amendment no more forbids double taxa-
tion than it does doubling the amount of a tax; short of confiscation or pro-
ceedings unconstitutional on other grounds." 76
The question of the states' right to tax interstate commerce dates back
to Brown v. Maryland,77 where Chief Justice Marshall by way of dictum in-
terpreted the commerce clause as a barrier to the states' power to tax inter-
state commerce. For more than a century after this decision, the Supreme
"
2 Taxation of a single event by more than one state works a disadvantage to interstate
businesses. In effect this places local businesses in a favored position and thus discourages
interstate commerce. In order to avoid multiple taxation of a single transaction or event, the
Supreme Court via the commerce clause has allowed the various states to apportion the
tax. See generally note, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75
HARv. L. REV. 953 (1962).
78 Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Gerosa, 16 N.Y.2d 320, 213 N.E.2d 677, 266 N.Y.S.2d 378
(1965), appeal dismissed, 87 S. Ct. 611 (1967). Petitioner, a Delaware corporation doing
business in New York City, made deliveries to customers in New Jersey and Connecticut on
sales consumated in New York. New Cork City levied a gross receipts tax on all businesses
within the city. The issue presented for appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the com-
merce clause or the due process clause were violated through the use of an allocation formula,
by which a calculated percentage of interstate business was related to the activity within
the city.
" See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1938) (privilege
tax); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 96-7 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring
opinion) (franchise tax). Cf. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 668 (1949)
(privilege tax).
75An excellent example of this is General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
See also Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
76 Fort Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U.S. 532, 533 (1920). See also Illinois Central
R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157, 164 (1940); Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks,
253 U.S. 325, 330 (1920) (property tax); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisville,
245 U.S. 54, 59 (1917) (property tax); Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730, 732 (1903) (property
tax); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 524 (1886) (property tax).
125 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 449 (1827). This case involved a state tax on selling goods
imported from a foreign nation. The Court held that the constitutional ban (import-export
clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, and the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8) on state
taxation of imports kept the state from subjecting the goods to a general non-discriminatory
tax, so long as they remained imports. Then by way of dictum, he concluded by saying: "It
may be proper to add, that we suppose the principles laid down in this case, to apply equally
to importations from a sister state."
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Court adhered to the philosophy that the states could not tax interstate com-
merce3 8
The test utilized by the Court during this era to enforce the dictum of
Brown was whether the exaction placed a direct or indirect burden upon
interstate commerce. If the tax was found to bear directly on commerce, it
was forbidden under the commerce clause;7 9 if, however, the exaction had
only an indirect or remote effect upon interstate commerce, it was upheld as
exacting a fair contribution from the taxpayer for the benefits rendered by
the taxing state.8 0 In United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek,8' a Wis-
consin statute imposed a general income tax on all domestic corporations.
Even though part of the taxpayer's income was derived from transactions
interstate in nature, the Court upheld the exaction: "The distinction be-
tween a direct and indirect burden by way of tax or duty was developed,
and it was shown that an income tax laid generally on net incomes ... af-
fecting only the net receipts ... was only an indirect burden."
The direct-indirect burdens test did not meet with unanimous approval.
Mr. Justice Stone, for one, evidenced his dislike for the test in Di Santo v.
Pennsylvania.8 2 However, it was not until 1938 that he could release the
'See, e.g., Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 562 (1925) (franchise tax):
.a state cannot lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether on the transpor-
tation of subjects of commerce, the receipts derived therefrom, or the occupation or business
of carrying it on."
A typical example of the direct-indirect burdens test is found in Minnesota v. Blasius,
290 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1933) (property tax):
The States may not impose direct burdens upon interstate commerce, that is, they
may not regulate or restrain that which from its nature should be under control of the
one authority and free from restriction save as it is governed in the manner that the
national legislature constitutionally ordains. This limitation applies to the exertion of
the State's taxing power as well as to any other interference by the State with the
essential freedom of interstate commerce. Thus, the States cannot tax interstate com-
merce, either by laying the tax upon the business which constitutes such commerce or
the privilege of engaging in it, or upon the receipts, as such, derived from it.
See also Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 252 (1929) (excise tax); Alpha
Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 218 (1925) (excise tax); Kansas City,
Fort Scott & Memphis R.R. v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 227, 231 (1916) (franchise tax); Robbins
v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., supra note 63.
60 In Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148, 157 (1937), Alabama exacted
a franchise tax for the privilege of doing local business. The exaction was measured by the
property within the state. Since the taxpayer had gas lines in the state, although employed
in interstate commerce, the lines were used in computing the tax. The Court held the tax
valid: "There is no showing of any direct burden upon interstate commerce, the effect
upon that commerce being incidental and remote ..... " Cf. Eastern Air Transp., Inc. v. Tax
Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147, 153 (1932) (property tax).
247 U.S. 321, 328 (1918).
-273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (dissenting opinion):
In this case the traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring whether the
interference with commerce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too un-
certain in its application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value. In thus
making use of the expressions, "direct" and "indirect interference" with commerce, we
are doing little more than using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy
formula by which it is reached.
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Court from the manacles of the "traditional test." In Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue,88 Mr. Justice Stone, writing now for the majority, in-
troduced the "cumulative burdens" test for determining whether a tax tran-
scends the commerce clause. The "cumulative burdens" doctrine was pred-
icated upon two ideas: I) Businesses engaged in interstate commerce should
bear a just share of the tax burden;8 4 and 2) State taxes upon interstate com-
merce should be sustained where there was no risk of "cumulative burdens
not imposed on local commerce."8' 5
This criterion, which eventually became known as the "multiple burdens"
test was a drastic shift from the past. Whereas the direct-indirect burdens test
was predicated upon the philosophy that states could not tax interstate com-
merce,8 6 the multiple burdens test was formulated upon the theory that the
states could tax interstate commerce so long as there was no possibility of
multiple taxation.87 However, the states could always extricate themselves
from the danger of multiple taxation by apportioning the tax, so that the
taxing state would be levying upon only that portion of interstate commerce
as would be justly attributable to the business done in the state.88
The major development resulting from the multiple burdens theory took
place in the field of taxes either levied directly upon gross receipts, e.g., sales
taxes, or measured by gross receipts, e.g., privilege taxes. An example of this
was seen one year after Western Live Stock. In Gwin, White & Prince, Inc.
v. Henneford,89 the State of Washington exacted a privilege tax measured
by gross receipts. The taxpayer was a Washington corporation, who engaged
exclusively in interstate sales. While there was corporate activity within the
state, a substantial part of it was outside, where the sales were negotiated
and the contracts executed. Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the Court held
the tax unconstitutional:
Here the tax, measured by the entire volume of interstate commerce in which
appellant participates, is not apportioned to its activities within the state. If
Washington is free to exact such a tax, other states to which the commerce ex-




"See generally Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-"Direct Burdens,"
"Multiple Burdens," or What Have You?, 4 VAND. L. RaV. 496 (1951); Note, Federal Limita-
tions on State Taxation of Interstate Business, supra note 72, at 964-68.
"Illinois Central R.R. v. Minnesota, supra note 76; Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue, supra note 74; United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335 (1912); Under-
wood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, supra note 61. See n.3 to Mr. Justice Rutledge's con-
curring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 265-66 (1946).
"305 U.S. 434 (1939). See also J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938)
(gross receipts tax); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., supra note 51; Depart-
ment of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941); International Harvester




tends may, with legal right, lay a tax similarly measured for the privilege of con-
ducting within their respective territorial limits the activities there which con-
tribute to the service. The present tax, though nominally local, thus in its prac-
tical operation discriminates against interstate commerce, since it imposes upon
it, merely because interstate commerce is being done, the risk of a multiple bur-
den to which local commerce is not exposed. 90
Mr. Justice Stone's risk of "multiple burdens" test was short lived. The
Court retreated for a time into the pre-Stone Age of direct-indirect burdens
test.91 Finally the theory which is presently the law, was formulated in North-
western States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota.92 A divided Court speak-
ing through Mr. Justice Clark, felt that something more than a mere pos-
sibility of multiple taxation should be present in order to invalidate a tax
under the commerce clause. The exaction which Minnesota levied was a net
income tax and fairly apportioned to the business activities within the tax-
ing state. The Court recognized that even with an apportioned tax there was
still the potentiality of multiple taxation. Mr. Justice Clark disposed of this
problem by pointing out that there was "... nothing to show that multiple
taxation was present. We cannot deal in abstractions. In this type of case
the taxpayers must show that the formula places a burden upon interstate
commerce in a constitutional sense."93 Thus the test was formulated-mul-
tiple taxation must exist in fact.94 Therefore, the taxpayer can avail himself
of the protection of the commerce clause only if he proffers evidence show-
ing specifically that he was taxed on the same transactions in sister states. 95
"DUE COMMERCE"-MERGER OF THE Two CLAUSES
"'Due process' and 'commerce clause' conceptions are not always sharply
separable in dealing with these problems. To some extent they overlap."'96
This notion lies at the basis of the strong reaction 97 that has arisen to the
philosophy of attempting to decide these cases in terms of fine distinctions
with respect to "subject," "measure," "use tax," "sales tax," "direct burden,"
"indirect burden," and so on, and attempting to bring some logical order
out of the endless maze of cases by making still further distinctions. The
more liberal approach to the problem appears to be to discard the notion
that the two constitutional provisions are separate and successive questions
91 Id. at 439.
o' Freeman v. Hewit, supra note 88.
358 U.S. 450 (1959).
Id. at 463.
9 See General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra note 75; Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania,
370 U.S. 607 (1962).
11 Supra note 75.
9 International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra note 53, at 353 (dissent-
ing opinion).
7 See nn. 13 & 14 supra.
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to be asked and answered. Rather, this approach would have the Court
grant greater freedom to the states to implement the policy initially stated
in Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond,98 namely, that interstate com-
merce must "pay its [own] way." In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, "The
Court has not shared the doubts which some of us have had concerning the
propriety of the judiciary acting to nullify state legislation on the ground
that it burdens interstate commerce .. ."99 "I think that one who complains
that a state tax, though not discriminatory on its face, discriminates against
interstate commerce in its actual operation should be required to come for-
ward with proof to sustain the charge."'u ° With respect to due process, Mr.
Justice Black stated that although interpretation of the constitution may
result in the extension of the purposes of constitutional provisions, "... that
is no reason for reading the due process clause so as to restrict a State's power
to tax and sue those whose activities affect persons and businesses within
the state, provided proper service can be had."'u 0 (Emphasis added.) This
approach to the question of state taxation of interstate commerce, which
may well be called an economically realistic one, recommends itself to the
resolution of the problem as does the sword to the Gordian Knot.
Although McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co.1 02 was decided under the technical
distinction between a sales tax and a use tax, 03 it is perhaps the first example
of the Court's failure to articulate exactly into which constitutional frame
of reference it was placing its decision. In due process language, the Court
concluded that for the state to impose a tax on the transactions there in
question would be "to project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax an
interstate transaction."' 04 (Emphasis added.) However, after a discussion
of whether the taxing state had sufficient connections with the subject of
the tax, namely the sale, the Court stated:
In view of the differences in the basis of these two taxes [sales tax and use tax]
and the differences in the relation of the taxing state to them, a tax on an inter-
state sale like the one before us and unlike the tax on the enjoyment of the
goods sold, involves an assumption of power by a State which the Commerce
Clause was meant to end.'0 5 (Emphasis added.)
As a result, Dilworth has been cited as authority for the proposition that
249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919).
Nippert v. City of Richmond, supra note 62, at 435 (dissenting opinion).
10o Id. at 437.
101 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 325 (1945) (opinion of Mr. Justice
Black). "I believe that the Federal Constitution leaves to each state, without any 'ifs' or
'buts,' a power to tax and open the doors of its courts for its citizens to sue corporations
whose agents do business in those States." Supra at 324.
80 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
10 See pp. 437-38 & note 50, supra.




solicitors are entitled to the "immunity of interstate commerce,"' 0 6 as well
as for the notion that
•.. the absence of any connection in fact between the commerce and the state
would be sufficient in itself for striking down the tax on due process grounds
alone; and even substantial connections, in an economic sense, [are] inadequate
to support the local tax.107
Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue'08 set the stage for the dissenters'
triumph' 09 in General Motors Corp. v. Washington.110 The Norton case re-
sulted from the imposition of an Illinois occupation tax, measured by gross
receipts, on persons engaged in selling goods within the state. The peti-
tioner, a Massachusetts corporation, had a branch office in Chicago, which
engaged in some local business. The sales to the Illinois customers fell into
three categories: first, the over-the-counter sales of items maintained in in-
ventory, with respect to which there was no dispute concerning their being
taxed; second, the sale of goods ordered from the home office in Massachu-
setts through the local outlet or ordered directly from the home office and
delivered through the outlet; third, the sale of goods ordered directly from
the home office by the Illinois buyers and shipped directly to them."' The
petitioner contended that the latter two classes of sales could not constitu-
tionally be included in the measure of its tax. The Court reasoned that when
Norton engaged in local business and submitted itself to the taxing power
of the state "it can avoid taxation on some Illinois sales only by showing that
particular transactions are dissociated from the local business and interstate
in nature. 1" 2 Thus, a presumption was raised that any sale made in the state
is a taxable incident of the foreign corporation's local business. Applying
an administrative law test to the determination of the lower court, the ma-
jority stated that, "in light of all the evidence, the judgment attributing to
the Chicago branch, income from all sales that utilized it either in receiving
the orders or distributing the goods was within the realm of permissible
judgment.""13 With respect to the orders and deliveries not channeled
through the Chicago outlet, however, the Court reversed the judgment and
declared them non-taxable.
The only items that are so dearly interstate in character that the State could not
reasonably attribute their proceeds to the local business are orders sent directly
106 Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra note 75, at 538.
107Nippert v. City of Richmond, supra note 62, at 423.
"I, Supra note 75.
10 See n.13 supra.
f0 377 U.S. 436 (1964). See p. 432, supra.
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to Worcester [Massachusetts] by the customer and shipped directly to the cus-
tomer from Worcester. Income from those we think was not subject to this tax.114
This was the sole statement the Court made to justify excluding these
sales. What is unclear, and results in a basic difference of opinion among the
members of the Court,11 is whether these sales were excluded by overcoming
solely a due process presumption in favor of "sufficient connections" be-
tween these sales and the local activity (which is in effect the subject of the
tax), or a due process and commerce clause presumption, the latter being
in favor of a fair apportionment of the tax to the activities within the state.
To analyze the question thus stated, requires a comparison between the
majority opinion in Norton and the dissenting opinions in General Motors
on one hand, and the dissent of Justices Black, Clark and Douglas in Norton
and their majority opinion" 6 in General Motors on the other. Although it
is unclear from the dissent in Norton just how comprehensive the presump-
tion should be, it is clear that the three Justices felt that the presumption
was not overcome. 11 7 When writing for the majority in General Motors, how-
ever, their position became apparent. They would merge the application of
the due process clause with that of the commerce clause and are thus able to
state their test in terms of "whether the State is exacting a constitutionally
fair demand for that aspect of interstate commerce to which it bears a spe-
cial relation."118 Stated another way, they would emphasize the "operating
incidence of the tax" and thus question "whether the State [is exerting] its
power in proper proportion to the appellant's activities within the State
and to appellant's consequent enjoyment of the opportunities and protec-
tions which the State has afforded."" 9 Thus the majority was able to con-
clude that "Since General Motors elected to enter the State in this fashion,
[it could not be said] that the Supreme Court of Washington erred in hold-
ing 20 that these local incidents were sufficient to form the basis for the levy
of a tax that would not run contrary to the Constitution."' 21 The Court cited
Norton as authority for this proposition. 22
I,4 ld. at 539.
Id. at 541-42 (Justices Black, Clark and Douglas dissenting). General Motors Corp. v.
Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 449-51 (1966) (Mr. Justice Brennan dissenting).
36 Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Harlan voted with the majority.
1 Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra note 111, at 541 (Mr. Justice Clark's dis-
senting opinion). "The general rule, applicable here, is that a taxpayer claiming immunity
from a tax has the burden of establishing his exemption. Petitioner has failed to meet this
burden."
"s General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra note 115, at 440. This test of constitution-
ality was first stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in Central Gray-
hound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 661 (1948).
"I Id. at 441.
"0 Once again the Court applies an administrative law test to the holding of a state court.
ma Id. at 447-48.
10 Id. at 448.
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On the other hand dissenting Justices Brennan and Goldberg123 inter-
preted the presumption recited in Norton in a much narrower and tradi-
tional manner as merely establishing the necessity for a taxpayer to demon-
strate that his transactions were dissociated from the local business (a due
process question) 124 and not as initiating a presumption in favor of fair ap-
portionment (a commerce clause question).12 5
Mr. Justice Brennan reiterated that the due process clause requires the
state to show some minimum connection between a tax and a transaction
within a state. The fulfillment of this requirement, he contended, is a "pre-
condition" to examining the second question, i.e., whether under the com-
merce clause the tax is fairly apportioned to the activity carried on within
the state.
In concluding that the tax in this case include a fair apportion, however, the
Court relies upon the fact that Washington has sufficient contacts with the sale
to satisfy the Norton standard, which was formulated to meet the quite different
problem of defining the requirements of the Due Process Clause.126
Likewise, Mr. Justice Goldberg read Norton differently. "This decision
departs from Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue... and adopts a test
there rejected."' 27 Presumably the reference is to the Clark dissent in Norton.
It is therefore apparent that the majority in General Motors has in a sense
consolidated the due process and commerce clauses. Perhaps the best evi-
dence of this is in Section IV of the Court's opinion, where the majority set
up a minimum contacts test to answer the question of fair apportionment. 128
After noting that this privilege tax is measured by unapportioned gross re-
ceipts, the Court concludes that the test of such a suspect tax should
be "... .whether it is so closely related to the local activity of the corporation
as to form 'some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state
and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.' "129 This minimum
connection test, however, was laid down in Miller Bros. v. Maryland130 to
determine the constitutionality of a tax under the due process clause. 131 Its
use by the Court in General Motors with reference to fair apportionment
is therefore noteworthy since apportionment and multiple taxation are not
due process problems but rather questions falling under the commerce
clause.13 2
L'- Mr. Justices Stewart and White joined in Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent.
22 Cf. American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965).
22 See p. 440 supra.
I General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra note 115, at 450 (dissenting opinion).
= General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra note 115, at 454 (dissenting opinion).
128 General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra note 115, at 448.
Ibid, quoting Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
io Supra note 129.
m See p. 436 supra.
1 2 See p. 440 supra.
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In a manner consistent with General Motors, the state courts have not
separated the tax issues distinctively into two categories. Rather, they have
treated the issue either as a general due process question 138 or as a general
commerce clause controversy, 34 which ever was appropriate in the factual
context. In Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 1 5 for ex-
ample, the State of Illinois attempted to levy a use tax on a non-resident
mail order vendor. The taxpayer, having no connection with Illinois except
for solicitation by way of catalogues, raised three grounds for reversal of the
judgment which was entered against it in the lower court: 1) Illinois did not
have in personam jurisdiction over the taxpayer and thus violated the due
process clause; 2) the Illinois tax, in so far as it required the taxpayer to
collect the use tax from Illinois citizens, was a denial of due process of law;
and 3) the Illinois tax violated the commerce clause.
The discussion of the first point led the court to conclude that there was
proper jurisdiction. 36 However, when the court delved into the purely tax
aspect of the case, it proceeded to discuss at length the due process clause's
"minimum connection" doctrine and concluded that "... the Use Tax Act
does not deprive the defendant of due process of law under the Federal or
Illinois constitutions nor does it violate the commerce clause of the Federal
constitution."' 3 7 The latter part of the conclusion seemed to be an after-
thought on the part of the court, since it was not discussed at all in the opin-
ion.
As a result of General Motors and other recent cases in this field, 138 the
states have been given a much freer hand in drawing their tax laws to meet
their fiscal needs. 139 The present economically oriented Court has come a
long way from the days of Brown v. Maryland,140 and the impact of its ra-
tionale falls squarely upon the commercial taxpayer. Thus, in order for the
out-of-state taxpayer to avail himself of constitutional arguments against the
validity of a tax, he must not only extricate the purely interstate transactions
from those associated with local business, but, further, he must demonstrate
either that multiple taxation exists in fact or that the transactions have no
3American Oil Co. v. Neill, supra note 124; Department of Revenue v. National Bellas
Hess, Inc., 34 Ill. App. 2d 164, 214 N.E.2d 755, prob. juris. noted, 87 S. Ct. 58 (1966).
'"Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Gerosa, supra note 73; Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp.
v. State, 401 P.2d 623 (Wash. 1965); El Paso Electric Co. v. Calvert, 385 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.
1965).
I Supra note 133.
Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., supra note 133, at 172-76, 214
N.E.2d at 760-62.
1mJ7d. at 172, 214 N.E.2d at 760.
"'5 Concerning income taxes, see Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
supra note 92. See Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 94, for a case dealing with a
property tax.
"I See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Miller Bros. v. Maryland, supra note 129.
'1425 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
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connections with the taxing state. Congressional action is badly needed in
this area141 and it appears that Congress may be the only hindrance left to
freedom by the states to tax interstate commerce.
'"' Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 92, at 476-77 (dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter):
The problem calls for solution by devising a congressional policy. Congress alone can
provide for a full and thorough canvassing of the multitudinous and intricate factors
which compose the problem of the taxing freedom of the States and the needed limits
on such state taxing power.. . . Congress alone can formulate policies founded upon
economic realities, perhaps to be applied to the myriad situation involved by a properly
constituted and duly informed administrative agency.
A bill is presently under consideration before Congress, which would fulfill the judiciary's
desire to have the problem of state taxation of interstate commerce settled by legislation.
H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The bill provides, inter alia, (1) a uniform juris-
dictional rule based upon the maintenance of a "business location"; (2) an optional two-
factor (property and payroll) apportionment formula for the allocation of net income; (3)
rules in the sales and use tax area for locating sales for tax purposes in the state of destina-
tion; (4) a remedy for discrimination by the states in the sales tax and gross receipts tax
area; and (5) for a continual evaluation by Congress of state progress in resolving problems
not solved by the bill.
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